PENNSYLVANIA AT GETTYSBURG

 

DEDICATION OF MONUMENT

 

41ST REGIMENT INFANTRY*

(TWELFTH RESERVES)

 

ADDRESS OF BRIG.-GEN. MARTIN D. HARDIN

 

 

THE Gettysburg campaign, on the Union side, began with the battle of Brandy Station, one of the results of which was the knowledge that Lee's army was moving northwestwardly. This action was the most important, as well as the most severe, the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had fought. By it the Union cavalry not only developed the Confederate plan of campaign, but also learned its equality with the enemy's cavalry.

As soon as General Hooker received certain information that Lee had extended his army from Fredericksburg to the Shenandoah Valley, he proposed to General Halleck to attack Lee's rear at Fredericksburg. This movement was disapproved. Hooker then gave orders preparatory to meeting Lee's army in its northwestward movement. There was some delay due to instructions from General Halleck, but in a few days the Union army moved between the Confederate army and Washington, with the main body of its cavalry on its left (west) flank. The cavalry covered the Union army most thoroughly, it never performed its duty toward that army in a more scientific (military) manner. The fighting about Aldie, Upperville and Middleburg, Va., was admitted by the Confederates to have been the best the Union cavalry had ever done, except at Brandy Station (Beverly Ford). The cavalry was supported by a small infantry force both at Brandy Station (Beverly Ford) and in the region about Middleburg. The German officer Major Von Borcke, and others, state that Stuart's Confederate cavalry was never more numerous (Von Borcke estimated it at twelve thousand and twenty-four guns), and never in better condition. Considering this, we can then better appreciate the fine work done by the Union cavalry in this advance northward. The Confederate cavalry con-

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*Organized at Harrisburg August 11, 1861, to serve three years. It was mastered out June 11,1864, by reason of expiration of term of service.

 

288 Pennsylvania at Gettysburg.

 

siderably outnumbered the Union up to the time that General Stahel’s Cavalry Division, from the defenses of Washington, joined the Army. The Army of the Potomac moved slowly northwestward, crossed the Potomac June 26-27. Lee's main army had crossed this river at or near Williamsport, Md., June 23-24. When Hooker reached the vicinity of Washington his army had been much reduced by expirations of terms of service (Hooker said about forty thousand). He now learned that there was a large number of troops (about thirty-seven thousand) in the defenses of Washington. Inasmuch as the Army of the Potomac now covered Washington he requested that some of these troops be sent to reinforce his army. He was authorized to take Stahel's Division of Cavalry and the Pennsylvania Reserve Division of Infantry. He ordered the Pennsylvania Reserve Divi­sion (June 24) to join his army. ,

When the Reserves heard that Lee again threatened, to invade Maryland and possibly Pennsylvania, officers, and men began to take on the military air which had been somewhat put aside after Fredericksburg, and talk of applying to rejoin their comrades of the Army of the Potomac on their march northward became prevalent. This went so far, in one case at least, as to be put in the form of a written petition. Whatever the form, the feeling of the command, from drummer boy to chaplain, was to take another turn at the "Johnnies"—to go in for a fight—if Lee's army went as far north, as Pennsylvania.

June 24, 1863, the Twelfth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Gustin commanding, formed a part of the Third Brigade ; Colonel Fisher commanded the brigade and General Crawford the Reserve Division. The Third Bri­gade, consisting of the Fifth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Dare; Tenth, Colonel Warner: Ninth, Colonel Anderson ; Eleventh, Colonel Jackson, and Twelfth, Lieutenant-Colonel Gustin, was in camp at Minor's Hill, Vir­ginia. The First Brigade, Colonel McCandless commanding, consisting of the First Rifles (Bucktails), First, Second and Sixth Regiments, was in camp at Fairfax Court House. Second Brigade, Colonel Sickel commanding, consisting of Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth regiments, was on provost duty in Alexandria, Va. In accordance with instructions from General Hooker, General Crawford ordered the three brigades of the Penn­sylvania Reserve Division to march on the 25th. The First and Third brigades moved accordingly, but the Second Brigade was detained by Gen­eral Slough, Military Governor of Alexandria. He though a veteran bri­gade necessary to keep convalescents in camp! In violation of all mili­tary principles (and it might possibly be said in violation of patriotic mo­tives) he retained this splendid body of veterans against their will and in disobedience of General Hooker's orders. However, he was sustained by the action of the military coterie which surrounded our noble President. This coterie never forgave Hooker for his first dispatch upon assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, namely, requesting that General Stone be made his chief-of-staff. Not only did this coterie refuse to enter­tain General Hooker's charges against General Slough, but it refused him control of the large force at Maryland Heights, and ultimately forced him to throw up the command of the army.

 

Pennsylvania at Gettysburg. 289

 

The Twelfth Regiment moved with the Third Brigade, in a rain storm, on the 26th, marching to Goose Creek, Va. The division had been delayed two days waiting for transportation. The First Brigade joined the Third en route, the two brigades, about three thousand four hundred and seventeen strong, camping together at Goose Creek. On the 27th the division moved at daylight, marched along the Leesburg turnpike. It was much delayed by the trains of the Army of the Potomac, and by its own train. General Crawford telegraphed General Meade commanding the Fifth Corps as follows:

 

"ON THE MONOCACY, June 27, 4:15 p.m.

 

GENERAL: I have received orders from headquarters Army of the Potomac to join your corps; I am on my way and just in from the rear; tonight I will encamp above the mouth of the Monocacy, as I find my train, which is entirely new, cannot go far­ther; have two brigades; Second detached at Alexandria. It I receive no instructions  to the contrary, I shall move at daylight, to overtake, It possible, your command."

 

The division crossed the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry, on pontoon bridge, and camped at night at mouth of the Monacacy. Colonel Hardin, of Twelfth, joined en route. "Sunday, 28th, clear and pleasant, moved at day­light and soon crossed the aqueduct of Chesapeake and Ohio canal at the Monocacy, and passed through Buckeystown, bivouacked on Ballinger's creek about two miles from Frederick, Md. ; here joined the Fifth Corps." General Meade was this day assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac, General Sykes to that of the Fifth Corps. Hooker had advanced a portion of his army through South Mountain passes, with the view of cutting Lee's communications, but this movement was disapproved at Washington, and the corps advanced through the mountains were ordered back to Frederick and directed to proceed up the east base of these moun­tains. This latter movement was taking place when the Reserve Division joined the army. The greater part of the Union army at this time rested near Frederick. At this date (June 28). Lee's army was stretched from Hagerstown to the Susquehanna near Harrisburg, and to York, Pa. Ewell's Corps at Carlisle and York; Lee's headquarters with Longstreet's and Hill's corps near Chambersburg. Lee was preparing to cross the Susquehanna, but that night, he says, "he learned from a scout that the Union army had crossed the Potomac and was threatening his communica­tions at South Mountain." "It was resolved," he says, "to concentrate the army east of the mountains."

Meade states, "That he had no special plan but to move northward until he made Lee let go of the Susquehanna." Meade learned, on the 30th, that Lee was moving with his main force to the east side of the mountains, and he decided to concentrate his army on Pipe creek.

There was an assemblage of officers of the Reserve Division, whilst it was camped near Frederick, looking over maps of the country, and guessing at the future movements of the Union and Confederate armies. Colonel Warner of the Tenth, and Colonel Hardin of the Twelfth, agreed that the chances were in favor of a fight at or near Gettysburg, the next good crossing place in the mountains, north of our then position, as shown by the maps we had. The morning of the 29th, the writer visited Frederick and conversed with officers of General Reynolds' command (First and Eleventh Corps), all thought they were going to Gettysburg, or spoke of that place

 

290 Pennsylvania at Gettysburg.

 

as their ultimate destination. Returning towards camp the writer met the division en route to Frederick. It had left Ballinger's creek about noon. We marched but a short distance when the division was stopped to let other troops take precedence. The division remained here several hours, it then followed the artillery reserve. The writer during this delay, visited his old friend, Lieutenant "Cog" Hazlett, who commanded Battery "D” Fifth United States Artillery. The weather was very warm and Lieu­tenant Hazlett wore a small soft white hat. As the writer left him to rejoin his command, he called back, " 'Cog' we are going to have a fight soon, don't wear that white hat into battle." At 7 p. m., we crossed the Monocacy bridge on the Baltimore pike and turned up the bank of the stream heading north, soon after we waded the stream and struck across the fields, and about 10 p. m. bivouacked in a wood, having made a tire­some day's march of ten miles." The long delay before mentioned caused our division to get far behind the other divisions of the corps, we had to rush along, well into the night, to reach the corps camp, where the lead­ing divisions had arrived early in the evening and in good order. Having arrived in camp late, and it being very dark, we made a bivouac, whilst we saw the other division of the Fifth Corps in a regular camp. Most of us were so hot and tired we dropped down and went to sleep without even making coffee. A bad beginning for a long march. "The morning of the 30th, we started early, passed through Liberty, Union Bridge and Uniontown (a pontoon train accompanied us this day), march twenty miles and bivouacked. Near dark were mustered two miles beyond Uniontown." The marching all the forenoon was very slow with many stops, but in the afternoon we were again rushed along. This march was the cause of great injustice done the division by our new corps commander, in that he re­ported to the army commander that our division could not march as fast as the other divisions. It will be noted that these other divisions had clear roads, no trains to follow, early start, no forced delays, nothing to pre­vent them from making their marches in time.

The Twelfth Regiment, moving with the Pennsylvania Reserve Division, left camp two miles beyond Uniontown at 5 a. m., July 1. Hearing of Confederate cavalry in the country, skirmishers and flankers were thrown out to cover the division, which moved thus several miles. About 2 p. m., halted on Pennsylvania State line; at 3 p. m., were addressed by General Crawford. General Meade's orders on the expected battle had been read to us before we started. We then moved on till we came to a fine open woods where we rested till dark. All day we had been enjoying the cherries which overloaded the trees along the roadside. The turnpike along which we marched a great part of the day was white, hot and dusty. We passed Kilpatrick’s battlefield at Hanover, and, at dark, took up our march again, and continued moving until utterly exhausted; about dawn we dropped down, compelling a halt of the division. The marching during the night had been without proper halts. After resting about an hour we again took up the march, and continued it across country till about 12.30 p. m., when we arrived on the battlefield on the Balti­more pike, in rear of the center of the army.

Our division in the very hot weather, marched in the worst possible

 

Pennsylvania at Gettysburg. 291

 

manner, accomplished nearly seventy miles in three and a half days, and the afternoon and evening of the fourth day went to the top of Big Round Top. In the meantime General Buford, commanding a cavalry division, left Middleburg, Md., on 29th, arrived at Gettysburg on 30th;

passing through Gettysburg at noon (June 30), he reconnoitred west and north. He was here long enough to see the advantages of the Gettys­burg position, and he determined to hold it until he was driven away or relieved by infantry. The night of June 30, he notified General Reynolds, "that Hill's Confederate Corps was camped nine miles west of Gettys­burg, and Longstreet's behind Hill's; that no Confederate force had yet passed through the mountains from the north toward Gettysburg, but that such force would soon be at Heidlersburg," This information was subsequently shown to be correct. General Meade had directed General Reynolds, "that if he has to fall back, to do so on Emmitsburg, that the Third and Twelfth Corps will come to the assistance there of his and the Eleventh Corps."  When General Reynolds reached Gettysburg, at 8.35 a. m., July 1, Buford was with his artillery and dismounted skirmishers, standing off Hill's troops. Reynolds joined Buford in the seminary tower, and as old companions in arms, with perfect confidence in each other, discussed the position and the military situation. Reynolds decided at once to support Buford. He knew that if his troops could be brought up promptly to this position. Lee could be made to take the offensive, or be compelled to fall back with his whole force without fighting. And thus, if a battle took place here, the Union army would be enabled to fight on the defensive. Buford promised to hold on until Reynolds' bat­teries and infantry could get up. Reynolds felt sure his corps with the Eleventh could hold on until the Third and Twelfth could reinforce them. The information he had of Lee's army, showed that it was almost as badly scattered as was the Army of the Potomac. Four corps of the Union army could reach this ground by the early afternoon, and the Second Corps by sundown. Force enough, with proper management and good fighting, to withstand Lee's whole army coming up from several directions until the whole of the Union army could be assembled. It was most for­tunate for the Union side that it had such intelligent and energetic gen­erals in advance as Reynolds and Buford, generals who had the confidence of the army commander. General Meade giving General Reynolds (a fighting general) his advance with three corps, proved to that general, as to the world, that General Meade was not attempting to avoid a battle, but was only anxious that the fight, which must take place, should be a defensive one, on his side, if possible. A few minutes after his arrival, as soon  as he had taken a look at the ground from the seminary tower and had had a few minutes conversation with Buford, General Reynolds, who was a most accomplished artilleryman, seeing what fine ground, lay in every direction to the front for artillery (the arm well known to preponderate in the Army of the Potomac, more powerful and more numerous than Lee's, the only arm in which the Union army was superior to the Confederate), a battlefield to make an artilleryman grow en­thusiastic, requested Buford to hold on till his (Reynolds') batteries and

 

292 Pennsylvania at Gettysburg.

 

infantry could come up. He sent off in hot haste several officers for his own and the Eleventh Corps batteries, and to hurry up his own and Howard's infantry. He then went to select ground for his batteries (he had brought up with him Captain Hall, chief of artillery of his lead­ing division), so that no time would be lost. Reynolds thus anticipated the present German instructions for battle! In a few minutes Hall's Battery arrived and was immediately posted. Soon after, Reynolds' First Division came up and was posted to support the First Corps and Buford's batteries. In the expectation of the early arrival of Howard's batteries General Reynolds now went to select positions for them; whilst doing so he is struck down by a sharpshooter. Reynolds had already seized this good position, and had given such an impetus to his command, that it went on without a break, in carrying out his designs, under his able fighting successor. General Doubleday. Reynolds had planted the advance of the Union army in Lee's route, he had secured a position across all the roads leading east of the mountains at this point, a point where the Confederate army must assemble, if it united east of the mountains. Reynolds might have had three corps at Gettysburg, earlier in the day, but he would not run the risk of throwing this force against Lee's whole army, which might be at Gettysburg at the same time. He thus showed his prudence, but when he arrived there in person and was satisfied that the informa­tion received from Buford during the past night was correct, and learned that Lee's army was still en route to assemble at this point, he acted as the prompt and intelligent soldier that he was.

Buford's batteries and dismounted skirmishers succeeded in holding the enemy on the west side of Willoughby run till Wadsworth's Division ar­rived. Captain Hall, commanding the artillery of this division, had preceded the infantry and had posted his own battery in aid of Buford's batteries, which were doing heroic service on the Chambersburg road. As soon as it arrived Cutler's Brigade was posted on either side of the Chambersburg road and across an old railroad cut, to support these bat­teries. Meredith's (Iron) Brigade was sent to the left of the road to occupy a piece of woods which Hill's troops were entering. Heth (Con­federate division commander) attacked with four of his brigades at once the position held by Reynolds' force. The three right regiments of Cutler's Brigade were forced back. Reynolds ordered Meredith's Brigade to attack across the front of the Confederate force. This attack was successful, the Confederate General Archer and many of his men were captured.

These dispositions were just completed, in which his two brigades had defeated and almost destroyed two brigades of the enemy, when this accomplished general was killed. The falling back of Cutler's right, left Hall's Battery exposed, but the Fourteenth Brooklyn, Ninety-fifth New York and Sixth Wisconsin, changed front and charged the Mississippi troops attacking Hall's Battery and captured two Mississippi regiments in the old railroad cut. Rowley's Division of the First Corps was put in here; Robinson's division of the First Corps was held in reserve on Sem­inary Hill. Soon Rodes' division of Ewell's Confederate Corps attacked from the direction of Carlisle, and Robinson's Division was advanced to meet it. Baxter's Brigade went in on the right of Cutler, and afterward

 

Pennsylvania at Gettysburg. 293

 

took Cutler's position. General Paul's brigade went on right of Baxter's. Robinson's Division resisted well Rodes' attack and captured three North Carolina regiments. So far the First Corps had more than held its own. "If the Eleventh Corps had been as well handled and fought, the day would probably have seen no reverse." General Howard spread his two divisions. Barlow's and Schurz's to the right of the First Corps, but did not make strong connection with it. The Confederate seized Oak Hill, a prominent point between the Union corps, and charging from this point, turned the right of the First Corps and the left of the Eleventh. For­tunately General Howard had placed one of his divisions, Steinwehr's, in reserve on Cemetery Hill, and the left of the First Corps fell back in order and covered the retreat of the artillery and ambulances. But nearly five thousand prisoners were left in the enemy's hands. General Reynolds had, early in the day, sent word to General Meade that the enemy was in force near Cashtown and advancing on Gettysburg, and that he would endeavor to hold Gettysburg till reinforced. Soon after General Reynolds was killed the cool-headed Buford thought matters were not being con­ducted very well, and he sent off a dispatch to the effect that, "there seemed to be no head," and requested that some one be sent forward to command. It was, no doubt, in answer to this request that General Hancock was sent forward to take supreme command. When he arrived, matters looked badly, so much so, that he at first thought the part of the army here would have to be moved back. Soon, however, the bat­teries got into position on the left of the town, and Steinwehr's Division with Howard's batteries showed a good front on the right, and the ad­vantages of the position were explained to him, when he saw that Lee would have to continue to attack, so that it was only a question whether the Union army could at this point hold its position. By sundown all was ready to meet an attack. The Union position at this time appeared so strong General Lee and his corps commanders concluded they could not assault it that evening with success. Thus, two Union corps, even with the loss of their commander, had been sufficient to hold Lee for an entire day. How much easier and with how much less loss it could have been done if Reynolds had lived and been in command of three or four corps. General Lee's troops were disposed on Seminary Ridge, about one mile from the Union line and parallel to it. The Confederate line was about five miles long, concave to the Union line which was about three miles long. Lee's concave position enabled him to utilize his large reserve ar­tillery, both for connecting his wings and to crush the Union artillery, which latter had to be concentrated too much (on the third day the guns were only a yard apart). The defects of Lee's position were, his inability to make the troops on his long line act together, and his inability to rein­force either wing promptly, and these were probably the causes of the failure of his attacks. If he had entrenched his center and either of his flanks and had used his main army on either of Meade's flanks he would probably have succeeded in dislodging the Union army. It seems to have been the intention, that Ewell's Corps should attack early on the 2d, also it was thought Longstreet would be in position to attack on Confederate right by 9 a. m. Such was no doubt the understanding amongst the senior

 

294  Pennsylvania at Gettysburg.

 

Confederate general (except Longstreet) when they separated for the night (July 1). However, when morning came and the formidable position of the Union army crowned with earthworks and artillery was seen both by General Lee and General Ewell, General Lee (who went early to Ewell's front) hesitated to assault until he could have thorough reconnoissances made and until Longstreet's Corps should, be up. General Meade noticing the movements of Ewell's Corps and being strong himself on his right early in the morning ordered an attack by the Twelfth and Fifth corps to be supported by the Sixth. But Slocum, commanding the Twelfth, and Warren, chief of engineers of the army, reported the ground unfavorable; also the Fifth Corps did not come up in good shape to attack before noon and the Sixth was then still far off. There has been much controversy between the Confederate generals, since the war, as to when Longstreet ought to have been ready to attack, also as to the time Ewell should have supported Longstreet's attack. It would appear that General Lee sent one of his staff early in the day to reconnoitre in front of the Union left. This officer went over the ground about the peach orchard; when he re­turned he told General Lee that this was favorable ground for making an attack. At this time, Sickles' Third Corps was massed on the left of the Second, on Cemetery Ridge. The ground on Lee's right consisted  principally of open fields. Longstreet's command was sent in a round-about way to get to the peach orchard position, so as not to be seen by the Union signal officer on Little Round Top. Longstreet himself was in no hurry, as he did not want to attack without his third division (Pickett's). Moreover, he states that the agreement on beginning the invasion was, "that there should be no offensive battle delivered by their army." If this is true General Reynolds is entitled to credit for making Lee change his plan. Whilst Longstreet was moving around the Union left. Sickles was moving out his corps and taking position on the Union side of the peach orchard. The controversy between Generals Meade and Sickles in regard to this movement is well known.

It seems to the writer that this matter stands about as follows: General Meade had been all the morning studying his right with a view of attack­ing or of receiving an attack there; no report had reached him that Con­federate troops were threatening his left. There was much open ground in front of his left; Meade supposed his cavalry (which had covered itself with honor the day before) which had been directed to watch the flank, would be able to give him early warning of any extensive movement of the enemy in that direction. Early in the afternoon, upon request of General Sickles to have ground selected for his corps to occupy. General Hunt, chief of artillery of the Union army, was sent to assist General Sickles in selecting a position. Sickles and Hunt could not find any good line in this region without going out very far to Sickles' front. It is now well known that the ground in front of Little Round Top is a most diffi­cult region in which to select a line of battle. Artillery could be of no use on the Little Round Top line, and how far the woods and difficult country extended to the left-front, neither Hunt nor Sickles knew. Taking into consideration the short time they had to select a position in so difficult a country, it was probably as well done as it could have been. Between

 

Pennsylvania at Gettysburg. 295

 

2 and 3p.m. the signal officer on Little Round Top and the skirmishers of Sickles' command detected Longstreet's movement. At General Sickles' urgent request General Meade went to his left about 3.30 p. m. to look up ground for Sickles' Corps. The fact seems to be that General Meade did not believe he would be attacked on the left. He thought his cavalry would certainly give him ample notice of any threatened attack on that front so that he would have time to prepare for it. If the cavalry had been where General Meade thought, and had reason to believe it to be, he would have had such notice. But it happened that Merritt's Brigade of Buford's Division, which had been ordered to relieve some of Gregg's Division, had left here before Gregg's Cavalry arrived to relieve Merritt; thus, at this critical time of the day there was no cavalry on the Union left-front. General Meade arrived on his left just as Longstreet's attack was be­ginning, and as Sickles' line was very far out in advance of Hancock, being ignorant of the region. General Meade thought Sickles had moved his line unnecessarily far out. However, when Sickles and Hunt told him what a tangled place the ground in front of Little Round Top was, he concluded to reinforce Sickles where he was. Moreover, there was then little or no time left to select a new line. The subsequent loss of the Third Corps position was due to the fact that the Fifth and Sixth Corps were not brought up soon enough, the one to Sickles' support, the other to form a second line on the Little Round Top ridge. If General Meade had been notified by his cavalry of Longstreet's movement, he would certainly have had the Fifth and Sixth Corps in place to meet this attack. Upon what small matters turn the fate of battles !

The new position of Sickles brought Humphreys' Division several hun­dred yards to the left-front of the Second Corps, and posted on the Emmitsburg road. Graham's Brigade of Birney's Division on the same road on Humphreys' left, reaching to the peach orchard. Ward's and De Trobriand's brigades stretched back to the rear, at right angles to Graham's Brigade, in front, respectively, of the wheatfield and of Devil's Den. Longstreet's attack with artillery began about 3 p. m. ; he concentrated his artillery opposite the angle of Sickles' Corps at the peach orchard, and opened such a concentrated fire on the Union artillery at this point as to overwhelm it. He then began his attack with his infantry, on his right, with Hood's Division, which pushed into the woods and outflanked the Third Corps on its left. Law's Brigade of Hood's Division, on extreme Confederate right, went over Big Round Top and came out on the Union ambulances, but this brigade had moved too far to its right; it had lost connection with balance of Hood's command, and it was ordered to move to its left. Hood's other brigades broke through the left of De Trobriand's line and began to pass up and around Little Round Top. The Union left being thus flanked and beginning to give way, McLaw's Division was pushed in on Hood's left; it carried the center of the Third Corps posi­tion. This corps was too weak to hold so long a line. The Union troops would now have had to fall back, but reinforcements commenced arriving just as the Confederates reached the Union position. Humphreys, who was not at first attacked, sent Burling's Brigade to Birney's assistance. The whole Fifth Corps was ordered up to the support of Birney's line. Barnes'

 

296 Pennsylvania at Gettysburg.

 

(First Division) arrived first, Tilton's and Sweitzer's brigades of this divi­sion going in near the peach orchard; Vincent's Brigade, at the request of General Warren, chief-engineer of the army, to Little Round Top; then came Caldwell's Division of the Second Corps to the wheat field, where its right was turned, and then two brigades of the Second Division of the Fifth Corps to the wheatfield, where they had scarcely arrived when their right was turned and they retreated to the position from which they had started, on the right of Little Round Top.

Soon McLaws' attack was supported by Anderson's Division of Hill’s Corps and Humphreys, although aided by Graham's Brigade, was driven back from the Emmitsburg road. Hancock sent two regiments of Gibbon's Division and Willard's Brigade of Hays' Division to assist Humphreys. General Sickles was here wounded, and General Hancock, assuming com­mand of the Third Corps, sent two additional regiments to help Hum­phreys. Finally General Meade brought up Stannard's Brigade, and a number of batteries were posted on Hancock's line, and the Sixth Corps came up and took the position on the right of Little Bound Top, from which the Third Corps had moved out. In the meantime Hood's troops had made a desperate effort to carry Little Round Top and the ravine between it and Big Round Top. General Warren going early in the action to the signal station on Little Round Top, had seen Hood's troops ap­proaching that position. The signal service men were about leaving when Warren arrived. He ordered them to remain and he hurried off for troops to put on Little Round Top. The Fifth Corps was coming up, and as he had formerly served most gallantly in command of a brigade of that corps, his request for a brigade was immediately answered by General Barnes who sent Vincent's Brigade, which, moving at a double-quick, beat the Texans of Hood's command to the top of Little Round Top. The fight­ing for this hill was fierce. Law's Brigade pushing through between Little and Big Round Top contended with Vincent for this ravine. Vincent was soon supported by Weed's Brigade of the Second Division of the Fifth Corps, and Hazlett's Battery was carried to the top of Little Round Top. When the ammunition of Vincent's and Weed's brigades was expended (both these brigade commanders being killed). Fisher's Brigade of the Reserves was hurried to their support. By this time the Confed­erates had become exhausted, and those who had not fallen back were captured. Upon arriving on the battlefield about 12.30 p. m., the Twelfth Regiment, as the entire division of the Reserves, was given time to rest and to make a full meal, the first since leaving Frederick, Md. As soon as we had feasted, many of the mounted officers of the division started out to see the line of battle. We rode up to the rear of the town of Gettysburg, then moved along the line of battle to General Meade's head­quarters, where we had a conversation with members of his staff, then we started to ride down General Hancock's line, when we heard the commence­ment of Sickles' fight. We galloped over to our camp where we found the Fifth Corps moving off to Sickles' support. We, at that time, had never heard of Round Top, Big or Little. The First Division of the corps led, followed by the Second Division, General Ayres commanding. Then came our division. Third Brigade leading, which at that time was well filled and

 

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closed up. We moved westerly along a wood road and soon came to a place where the road was narrow and corduroyed, a fence on one side and brush on the other; woods on both sides. As we advanced we began to meet wounded men returning; soon the road was so encumbered with wounded walking to the rear, and ambulances going the same way, we had to take to the woods along side of the road. This caused some delay. We filed up on the north side of the ridge to the right of Little Round Top. The ground here was rocky and covered with thick brush; some time was taken up in getting into position; eventually we got into line by brigade front, the Third Brigade in front. We then advanced to the crest of the ridge. As we reached the crest we got our first view of the battle on the left; it was not a reassuring sight! The whole valley between us and the ridge opposite, about a third of a mile off, was filled solid with our retreating soldiers and batteries, thousands of the soldiers wounded and all the batteries disabled. Some of the men, especially toward the left-front, were retreating at a run. The enemy's line was only visible by the white puffs of smoke at the crest of the opposite ridge. Very few of our men were firing—a man now and then would stop and take a shot. This great mass of thousands in the valley was moving sullenly to the rear at a walk. There seemed no organized force, a mere mass of men, officers and men, inextricably mixed—all seeking safety behind the ridge upon which we stood. A battery was making its way into position in the underbrush on our right and a few guns in position on the ridge to our left (since called Little Round Top), were firing slowly at the enemy in the woods beyond the opposite ridge. As soon as the division got into position (there being a lull in the action at this time) the writer rode up the ridge to the left to get a look at the enemy's position; when near the top he met a party of officers and men carrying General Weed, who was mortally wounded. The writer who knew the general personally, stopped to see if he could be of any service. Whilst conversing here, another party came along bringing back his old friend. Lieutenant Hazlett, who in the haste of going into action had forgotten that fatal white hat. He was shot through the head, probably by the same sharpshooter who had killed General Weed. .

Finding he could see little more here than at the position the division occupied, the writer started down; he met the Twelfth Regiment coming up with the Third Brigade except the Eleventh Regiment. We scrambled up and over Little Round Top and moved down the left-front, going to the assistance of Vincent's Brigade. As the Third Brigade moved away, the First Brigade was ordered to advance to the front. The Eleventh Regiment being still in its position when the First Brigade came up to the front line, it joined that brigade and advanced with it. We saw the First Brigade and Eleventh Regiment make their gallant advance through the retreating multitude, as we clambered over the rocks on top of Little Round Top. We joined in their cheer and started at a double-quick down the left-front of Little Round Top, stumbling over rocks, and the numerous dead of Vincent's and Weed's gallant brigades. As we advanced, a few bartering shots came from the retiring enemy. Our advance was most fortunate as Vincent's and Weed's brigades had expended all their am-

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munition. The Confederates (several hundred) remaining between Big and Little Round Top, seeing and hearing our advance, laid down their arms and became prisoners to the brigades which were so well entitled to receive them. Darkness ended the contest. Thus our small division coming on the field in the nick of time and advancing boldly, turned the tide of success on the left, and the enemy's great efforts, on their front were rendered entirely futile.

About 9 p. m. Colonel Fisher commanding the Third Brigade, with the consent of the division commander, ordered an advance up Big Round Top. The Twentieth Maine deployed as skirmishers, the Fifth and Twelfth regiments to follow in support in line of battle. The skirmishers started promptly, but on account of the darkness and difficulty of deploying into line in this rough place, it was some minutes after they started that the line of the Fifth and Twelfth followed.

The skirmishers went promptly to the top of the mountain; only an occasional shot was fired by the Confederates. The Fifth and Twelfth regiments advanced at the word of command given in Colonel Fisher's stentorian tones. The line upon advancing in utter darkness was almost immediately broken and became confused by the rocky, precipitous and difficult ground. Officers became separated from their men, but all pushed on up the mountain; when about one-third way up all order was lost. Officers and men of different companies and even of different regiments became intermingled. The commanding officers of the brigade and the regiments began calling to each other; the rocks and woods resounded with the cries. It is said, and no doubt with good reason, that the Confed­erate troops stationed at this time on the mountain, hearing all this noise, and knowing that the Sixth Corps had lately arrived, believing that whole corps was about taking position on Big Round Top, hastily retreated down their side of the mountain. The confusion was so great that officers and men of the Fifth and Twelfth regiments concluded to return to the position from which they had started, the valley between Big and Little Round Top. On making this ascent, a number of Confederate prisoners fell into the possession of the Fifth and Twelfth regiments. A squad of officers and men (about seventy) in which the writer found himself upon first descending to the foot of the mountain, sent forward two men to investigate the first camp fires seen. These scouts were answered by members of the Fifteenth Alabama. Our party then, after discussion, concluded to move around the mountain side toward the left or south in which direction we were sure of finding the Sixth Corps' pickets. We in this way, after an hour's very hard march, found the Vermont Brigade pickets and went at once to our starting point. In the meantime nearly all the members of the Fifth and Twelfth regiments had found their way back to the same place. The Twentieth Maine skirmishers finding themselves unsupported had returned to this starting point. It was now suggested that the Fifth and Twelfth regiments should march up the mountain by the flank, the Twentieth Maine skirmishers leading as before, this plan was adopted. Advancing in this manner, all soon reached the top in good order. The Twelfth on the crest; the Fifth on its right; the Twentieth Main skirmishers remained, out as pickets toward the left-front.

 

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The Fifth and Twelfth regiments threw out pickets in their front and to connect with the troops on the right. The Ninth and Tenth Reserves had been left in line across the ravine between Little and Big Round Top. Two regiments of Vincent's Brigade were posted in the interval between the right of the Fifth Reserves and the Ninth and Tenth Reserves, but almost at right angles to the general line. (See map accompanying the report of the commander of Vincent's Brigade.) The line remained thus until daylight when a regular connected line was formed from the top of Big Round Top to the top of Little Round Top, and stone breastworks were thrown up, which still stand (1888) as we left them. There was some sharpshooting on both sides (July 3d), Frank H. Hench, Company A, Twelfth Regiment, was killed and Joseph Aikens, Company Q, Twelfth Regiment wounded.

The Confederates on their right, about dark, slowly withdrew to the line the Third Union Corps had held. Ewell began his attack from Confed­erate left about sunset; he found the Union line stripped along his left, there was nothing but Greene's Brigade of the Twelfth Corps on the Union extreme right. Early attacked Cemetery Hill and Johnson, Culp's Hill. Early's attack was gallantly made but failed. Johnson carried the Union works on his left and remained in possession there. The result of the day's fighting has been described as follows:

"Longstreet had carried the whole front on which the Third Corps had been drawn; Ewell's left was thrust within the breastworks on the Union right, in a position, which if held by him", would enable him to take Meade's entire line in reverse, and the Union loss in the two days' combat had already reached the frightful aggregate of upwards of twenty thousand. But the army and corps commanders on Union side that night were unani­mous for fighting it out here."

If this is a just summary of the results of the two days fighting, was not General Lee justified in ordering an assault on the Union center? If that had yielded at all, would not Longstreet's two other divisions on Con­federate right and Ewell's whole corps on their left have followed up the success and overwhelmed the Union army? We now know, that an attack made in broad daylight, over open ground, against good troops, armed with modern weapons, although made strictly in accordance with the battle tactics of Frederick II. and Napoleon, must fail. As witness this grand attack and many made by General Grant's army en route to Richmond. In this third day's magnificent assault and heroic defense our regiment was only a deeply interested spectator. The grand scene was clearly in view to any one who would chance his life against the deadly sharpshooters by raising his head above the stone breastwork.

The First Brigade of the Reserves, under command of Colonel McCandless, advanced late in the afternoon of the 3d, and by its bold and skilful movements defeated a force more than twice its strength, and recovered all the ground lost by the Union army on the 2d.

The Third Brigade remained in the breastworks on Big Round Top until he morning of the 5th, when it moved off with the Fifth Corps toward Emmitsburg.

 

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The enemy withdrew the night of the 3d and morning of the 4th. Their absence being soon detected, many of us took this opportunity to visit the battlefield on the left and front.

The criticism of General Meade for not attacking the Confederate army after Gettysburg, was refuted by subsequent events. What chance had General Meade with a force no larger than the enemy, when General Grant with more than double the enemy's force in his repeated assaults suffered such heavy losses and accomplished so little? The numbers actu­ally engaged in the fighting were nearly equal. The Confederates were much the stronger July 1. The two sides were about equal the second day, the Union force probably the stronger the third day. The losses, July 1-3, as given by the Adjutant-General's office, were: "Union, twenty-three thousand and three; Confederate, twenty thousand four hundred and fifty-one."